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#2A-7/10/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS, 
DISTRICT UNION LOCAL 1, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
CASE NO. C-3 695 
-and- ' 
MOHAWK VALLEY NURSING HOME, 
Employer. 
BELSON & SZUFLITA (GENE M. SZUFLITA, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Petitioner 
TOBIN & DEMPF (JOHN W. CLARK, ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Mohawk 
Valley Nursing Home (Employer) to two decisions issued by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) which involve a representation election held pursuant 
to a petition filed by the United Food and Commercial Workers, 
District Union Local 1, AFL-CIO (Petitioner). 
The Director conducted a mail-ballot election in a 
stipulated unit which included "all full time and regular part 
time (more than 2 0 hours per week)" employees. The consent 
agreement executed by the parties further provides that the 
employees eligible to vote were those employed both as of 
June 29, 1990 and "on the date of the election". Ballots were 
mailed to unit employees on July 20. Employees were permitted to 
! 
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telephone PERB's office on July 27 if they had not received a 
ballot or needed a replacement. Voters were instructed that 
their ballots had to be received in the Latham post office by 
9:00 a.m. on August 9 for a ballot count which began at 11:00 
a.m. that date. 
The Director made the following determinations concerning 
challenges to certain of the ballots. He voided the following 
four ballots: 
1. Nancy Rotundi because she left employment before 
June 29; 
2. Janis Becker and Bridget S. Hunter because they left 
employment between June 29 and August 9; 
3. Mark Sommer because the Director considered him not 
employed by the Employer as of the August 9 count. 
Sommer last worked August 6, although he was given a 
benefit day for his last shift which ended at 7:00 a.m. 
on August 9. The Director determined that these 
circumstances did not evidence an "ongoing employment 
relationship". 
By decision dated September 4, 1990, the Director confirmed 
his decision to void the ballots of Rotundi, Becker, Hunter and 
Sommer. The Director also sustained the Employer's challenge to 
the ballot cast by Judith Foti. The Director voided her ballot 
because she had not worked "more than 20 hours" in any week 
covered by the 1990 payroll and attendance records submitted by 
the Employer. Finally, the Director did not consider or decide 
'^ 
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the Employer's challenge to Kristin Markwardt's ballot because 
her vote could not affect the election results and the 
confidentiality of her vote might be violated if she were ruled 
eligible. 
The Director determined that the Petitioner had received a 
majority of the valid votes cast and confirmed a final tally of 
ballots-^/ as follows: 
Void Ballots 5 
Votes Cast for Petitioner 42 
Votes Cast Against Petitioner 40 
Valid Votes Counted 82 
Challenged Ballots 1 
The Employer takes the following exceptions to the 
Director's September 4, 1990 decision: 
1. Becker's, Hunter's and Sommer's ballots were 
erroneously voided; 
2. The Director erred by failing to address the Employer's 
allegation that certain employees were disenfranchised 
under the call-in procedure; 
3. Markwardt's ballot should have been voided because she 
did not work the necessary hours per week; 
4. The Director erred by failing to address the Employer's 
demand for an on-site election. 
By letter dated September 12, 1990, the Employer filed 
objections to the election which are identical to the exceptions 
i'The Director specified in his decision that this tally 
fixed the period for filing election objections pursuant to 
§201.9(h)(2) of the Rules of Procedure. 
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taken by the Employer to the Director's September 4, 1990 
decision. By letter dated September 19, 1990, the parties were 
informed that only the allegations regarding the call-in 
procedure and the decision to conduct the election by mail were 
properly considered as objections to the election. Allegations 
regarding the eligibility of Becker, Hunter, Sommer and Markwardt 
were to be decided in the context of the pending exceptions to 
the Director's September 4, 1990 decision. 
By decision dated October 19, 1990, the Director dismissed 
those objections outlined in the September 19 letter. The 
Director determined that the decision to conduct the election by 
mail was reserved to his discretion by the parties' consent 
agreement and the Rules of Procedure, and was one which was 
reasonable, given the Employer's continuous three-shift 
operation. The objection directed to the call-in procedure was 
dismissed on the facts because the Employer showed only that one 
collect call was not accepted because it was not placed on the 
designated day. 
The employer filed exceptions to the Director's October 19, 
1990 decision which argue that the Director incorrectly dismissed 
the two objections to the election and that he should not have 
voided Becker's, Hunter's and Sommer's ballots. 
The two sets of exceptions filed by the Employer, although 
incorrectly commingling voter eligibility issues with unrelated 
objections to the mechanics of the election, together preserve 
all of the issues the Employer seeks to appeal. We will, 
Board - C-3695 -5 
therefore, consider the exceptions by category without 
specification or limitation to the particular decision to which 
the exceptions were filed. 
The Director's decision to hold an election by mail ballot 
is one reserved to his discretion under the totality of internal 
and external circumstances and conditions. His decision to 
conduct a mail ballot election in this case was not an abuse of 
discretion and we will not disturb his decision on the 
speculative claim that more employees might have voted if the 
election were held on-site, even assuming the Employer earlier 
reserved a right to object to the Director's decision.-2-/ 
We also dismiss the objection directed to an alleged abuse 
in the call-in procedure for the reasons stated in the Director's 
October 19, 1990 decision. In that respect, we agree that the 
Director properly limited his investigation to the facts provided 
to him by the Employer. 
As to the voter eligibility issues, we affirm the Director's 
decision to void the ballots cast by Becker and Hunter because 
they were not employed on both June 29, 1990 and on the date of 
the ballot count. The parties agree that unit employees cast a 
valid ballot only if employed on both the specified eligibility 
date and on "the date of the election". The former is a date 
certain, but the parties contest the meaning of the latter 
•^See the Director's discussion and dismissal of a similar 
objection in County of Erie and Sheriff of Erie County, 
18 PERB f4071, at 4123 (1985). 
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phrase. Although we have not had a prior opportunity to decide 
the issue, the Director has held previously that the "date of 
election" in a mail ballot election for purposes of determining 
voter eligibility is the date the ballots are counted.^ The 
Employer argues, however, that a mail ballot election is a 
process and it should be sufficient to establish eligibility for 
an employee to be employed anytime during that process.^/ We 
are unwilling, however, to hold that the Director's decision, 
which conditions voter eligibility in a mail ballot election on 
an employee's employment for the duration of that election 
process, is unreasonable or that it fails to promote the policies 
of the Act to have an informed and interested electorate. 
We reverse, however, the Director's decision to void 
Sommer's ballot because he was employed on the date the ballots 
were counted. Simple employment status as of that date satisfies 
both the Director's own decisions regarding the date of the 
election and the terms of the consent agreement executed by the 
parties in this case. The particular nature of that employment 
relationship is immaterial to a voter's eligibility. 
Having found Sommer eligible to vote, it would not be 
necessary to decide Markwardt's eligibility unless Sommer voted 
^Nassau County Regional Off-Track Betting Corp. , 
17 PERB H4066 (1984); County of Erie and Sheriff of Erie County, 
supra note 2. 
•^/The National Labor Relations Board will accept a mail 
ballot if the voter was employed on the date the ballot was 
) mailed. E.g., Plymouth Towing Co., 72 LRRM 1189 (1969); E.C.K. 
Miller Transportation Corp., 87 LRRM 1409 (1974). 
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against representation by the Petitioner for only then would her 
vote affect the results of the election. Moreover, Markwardt, 
unlike Sommer, is still employed by the Employer and her vote, if 
she is ruled eligible, would be disclosed unless she and Sommer 
made different ballot choices. Therefore, to minimize the 
opportunity for a breach of a current employee's secret ballot 
and to avoid making an eligibility determination which might not 
be necessary, we hereby remand the case file to the Director with 
instructions that Sommer's ballot be opened and counted. If 
Sommer*s vote is in favor of representation, we will certify the 
Petitioner because the remaining challenge could not affect the 
Petitioner's majority status. If Sommer votes against 
representation by the Petitioner, the file is to be returned to 
us for the necessary decision on Markwardt's eligibility. 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Director's 
decisions, except his determination regarding Sommer's 
eligibility, dismiss the Employer's exceptions except as to 
Sommer's eligibility, and remand the case to the Director for 
processing consistent with this decision. 
DATED: July 10, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric j&. Schmertz, Member 
#2B-7/10/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF DELAWARE Case No. S-0057 
for-a-determination—pursuant—to 
Section 212 of the Civil Service 
Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Pursuant to §212 of the Civil Service Law, the County of 
Delaware has submitted an application by which it seeks a 
determination that its Resolution No. 42, as amended on 
February 27, 1991 by Resolution No. 55, is substantially 
equivalent to the provisions and procedures set forth in Article 
14 of the Civil Service Law with respect to the State. 
Specifically, the amendment brings the County of Delaware's 
resolution into conformity with Chapter 485 of the Laws of 1990, 
which provides for arbitration of impasses between counties and 
detective-investigators employed in the office of a district 
attorney of a county not contained within a city with a 
population of one million or more. 
Having reviewed the application and having determined that 
the subject resolution, as amended, is substantially equivalent 
to the provisions and procedures set forth in Article 14 of the 
Civil Service Law with respect to the State, 
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IT IS ORDERED that the application of the County of Delaware 
be, and it hereby is, approved. 
DATED: July 10, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, C hairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member /^ 
Er:kc J. Schmertz, Member/ 
#2C-7/10/91 
{ ") STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHENECTADY FIRE FIGHTERS UNION, LOCAL 28, 
IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Charging__ Party, 
-and- CASE NOS. U-11480. 
U-11491 & U-11504 
CITY OF SCHENECTADY, 
Respondent. 
GRASSO & GRASSO, ESQS. (JANE K. FININ of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH, P.C. (WILLIAM M. WALLENS 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City of 
Schenectady (City) and the cross-exceptions of the Schenectady 
Fire Fighters Union, Local 28, IAFF, AFL-CIO (Union) to an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision which upheld in part and 
dismissed in part three improper practice charges filed by the 
Union alleging that the City violated §§209-a.1(a), (c) and (d) 
of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act). In 
particular, the AU" found that the City violated §§209-a.l(a) and 
(d) (but not (c)) of the Act when it unilaterally imposed upon 
fire fighter Robert Schottenham a requirement, under threat of 
disciplinary sanctions, to execute a release as a condition 
precedent to his return to work from a nonoccupational injury 
(Case No. U-11480); that the City violated §209-a.l(d) (but not 
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(a) and (c)) of the Act when it unilaterally imposed Directive 
No. 3, Code 1990, establishing new procedures to be utilized in 
dealing with the reoccurrence of a previous job related injury 
(Case No. U-11491); and that the City did not violate the Act in 
any -respect-when—it -req^ested-a—physicianis~note—per^itting-"f-i-re— 
fighter Norman Feldman to return to work "without restriction" 
following an occupational injury (Case No. U-11504). 
The City excepts to the findings of violations of 
§§209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Act in Case Nos. U-11480 and U-11491. 
The Union cross-excepts to the ALJ's dismissal of the portion of 
its charge in Case No. U-11480, which alleges that the City 
improperly discriminated against fire fighter Schottenham in 
violation of §2 09-a.l(c) of the Act; to the dismissal of so much 
of Case No. U-11491 as alleges violations of §§209-a.l(a) and (c) 
of the Act (including exceptions to evidentiary rulings related 
to those allegations); and to the ALJ's failure to find that all 
of Directive No. 3, Code 1990, was promulgated in violation of 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act. Because the Union has filed no exception 
to the dismissal of Case No. U-11504, the ALT decision in that 
respect is not before us and will not be reviewed.-^/ 
•i/The Union's brief, submitted in response to the City's 
exceptions and in support of its own cross-exceptions, is 
identical to the brief submitted to the ALJ. References in that 
brief to Case No. U-11504 are insufficient to establish 
exceptions in conformity with §204.10 of PERB's Rules of 
Procedure (Rules). 
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CASE NO. U-11480 (SCHOTTENHAM) 
In its exceptions, the City asserts that no violation of the 
Act occurred because the fire chief merely requested, but did not 
direct, Schottenham to appear at his office on February 23, 1990, 
to sign a release concerning his medical condition, prior to his 
return to work from sick leave. In support of this exception, 
the City points to the phrasing of the letter issued by the fire 
chief, which states: "Please report to Engine No. 6 at 080 0 
hours on February 24, 1990." It is our determination that 
notwithstanding the courteous manner in which the directive was 
phrased, a reasonable employee would perceive, as did 
Schottenham, that it was in fact a directive. There is no reason 
to believe that reporting by Schottenham at the date, time, and 
location indicated in the fire chief's letter was discretionary. 
The exception in this respect is accordingly denied. 
The City also excepts to the ALJ finding that an employee 
must be afforded union representation during discussions with the 
employer. While we agree with the City's assertion that the 
presence of a union representative at all discussions with City 
employees is not required by the Act, we do not interpret the ALJ 
decision to so hold. Indeed, the ALJ decision, as interpreted 
and affirmed here, requires in these circumstances only that 
union representation be permitted when the discussion between 
employer and employee involves a grievance processed pursuant to 
the negotiated grievance procedure in which the union has 
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appeared and is representing the employee. In the instant case, 
the discussion between Schottenham and the fire chief on 
February 23, 1990 related specifically to implementation of an 
arbitration award which was enforced pursuant to enforcement 
proceedings-brought—in—State-Supreme—Court.—On—these—facts-,—we 
affirm the ALJ's determination that Schottenham was entitled to 
union representation with respect to the establishment of a new 
condition to implementation of the arbitration award directing 
Schottenham*s return to work. 
The City's third exception asserts that the ALT erred when 
he failed to credit the testimony of the fire chief that 
Schottenham would not be considered absent without authorization 
if he did not sign the release letter presented to him at the 
meeting of February 23, 1990. Relying upon testimony of 
Schottenham and King, the Union representative present during the 
discussion, the ALJ determined that Schottenham was told, in 
words or effect, that he would not be permitted to return to work 
if he failed to sign the proper letter, and that he would be 
considered absent without authorization if he failed to report to 
work on February 24 in accordance with the letter. The ALJ's 
credibility determination is supported by testimony in the record 
and will not be disturbed by us. The exception is accordingly 
denied. 
In its cross-exceptions, the Union contends that the ALJ 
erred in dismissing the allegation of violation of §209-a.l(c) of 
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the Act, asserting that the imposition of a requirement that 
Schottenham execute a release of liability for injuries sustained 
following his return to work constituted discrimination for his 
participation in protected union activity (i.e. the contract 
grievance—procedure)-.—Notwithstanding—this—exception-,—we- concur— 
with the ALJ * s finding that the record does not support such a 
determination. Rather, the record establishes nothing more than 
that the City had a reasonable concern about its liability for 
future injuries to Schottenham based upon his medical condition. 
While the procedures used by the City to put its concern to rest 
were found by the ALJ, and here affirmed by this Board, to be 
^ subject to bargaining and union representation, it has not been 
established that the City's determination to seek to avoid 
liability constitutes unlawful discrimination, coercion, or 
retaliation. The cross-exception is accordingly denied. 
Based upon the foregoing, the ALJ decision with respect to 
Case No. U-11480 is affirmed in its entirety. 
U-11491 (DIRECTIVE NO. 3. CODE 1990) 
The ALJ found that by issuing Directive No. 3, Code 1990, 
the City made unilateral changes in terms and conditions of 
employment of fire fighters represented by the Union. Directive 
No. 3, Code 1990, was found by the ALJ to effectuate a different 
procedure for handling absences occasioned by recurrence of 
previous job-related injuries than had occurred prior to its 
) 
issuance. The particular respect in which the ALJ found a change 
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to have occurred is that at the onset of the recurrence of 
disability and absence resulting therefrom, employees are 
initially placed upon sick leave, which is made available 
pursuant to the terms of the parties• collective bargaining 
agreemen.t,„rather„jthan_upon^ JLinJAired„leav„eJL,^ which„is„prov^ ided 
pursuant to §207-a General Municipal Law (GML) and which 
constituted the previous practice. Under the new procedure, fire 
fighters presenting medical documentation from their physician or 
the City's physician that the absence is the result of recurrence 
of a previous job-related injury, will have their leave status 
converted from contractual sick leave to statutory injured leave. 
This procedure represents a departure from past practice both 
because of the initial placement of the employees on sick leave 
rather than injured leave, and because the employees are now 
required to obtain documentation from their physician that the 
"absence is due to recurrence of a specific job-related injury". 
The City argues that because sick leave is provided pursuant 
to the parties' agreement on an unlimited basis, as is injured 
leave pursuant to §207-a GML, no change in terms and conditions 
of employment has occurred. However, there is at least one 
substantive difference between sick leave and injured leave, 
i.e., that employees are entitled to payment for medical 
treatment while on injured leave pursuant to §207-a(l) GML, while 
employees on contractual sick leave are not. Additionally, §207-
a(3) GML makes certain provisions for light duty not applicable 
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to persons on sick leave. 
Based upon the foregoing, and notwithstanding the exceptions 
of the City to the AKJ determination in this regard, we find that 
Directive No. 3, Code 1990, constitutes a unilateral change in 
terms_and_coiidi±ions_o±_employjnent-^ n_this_resp.ec-t-. 
The Union's exceptions assert that Directive No. 3, Code 
1990, reflects unilateral changes in terms and conditions of 
employment in other respects also. However, our search of the 
record establishes no other respects in which the parties' 
previous procedures have been altered by its implementation. 
Accordingly, we decline to adopt the Union's position that 
rescision of each and every aspect of the Directive is required 
by the Act. To the extent that the Union argues that requirement 
of a physician's note indicating ability to return to full duty 
with no restrictions constitutes a unilateral change, the ALT 
found, in connection with Case No. U-11504 (Feldman), that a 
practice of requiring notes permitting return to full duty 
existed previously, and that no unilateral change accordingly 
took place. Although that matter is not now before us, our 
holding here is consistent with the ALJ decision, which is final 
and binding upon the parties in that regard. 
Case Nos. U-11480, U-11491 & U-11504 -8 
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
City: 
1. Rescind the letter of February 22, 1990 addressed to 
Fire Fighter Robert Schottenham and expunge same from 
his personnel file; 
2. Rescind those portions of Directive No. 3, Code 199 0, 
found here to be violative of the Act and expunge those 
portions of the Directive from the records regularly 
kept by the Schenectady Fire Department; 
3. Place any fire fighter put on sick leave by reason of 
application of Directive No. 3, Code 1990, on injured 
\ leave status; 
4. Post the attached notice at places normally used to 
communicate information to unit employees. 
DATED: July 10, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Chairperson Kinsella recused herself. 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Schenectady 
Fire Fighters Union, Local 28, IAFF, AFL-CIO that the City of 
Schenectady will: 
1. Rescind the letter of February 22, 1990 addressed to 
Fire Fighter Robert Schottenham and expunge same from his 
personnel file; 
2. Rescind those portions of Directive No. 3, Code 1990, 
found here to be violative of the Act and expunge those 
portions of the Directive from the records regularly kept 
by the Schenectady Fire Department; 
3. Place any fire fighter-put on sick leave by reason of 
application of. Directive No. 3, Code 1990, on injured 
leave status. 
City of Schenectady 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GLENS FALLS FIREFIGHTERS UNION, 
LOCAL 2230, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NOS. U-lllll 
-and- &-U--1-1364 
CITY OF GLENS FALLS, 
Respondent. 
GRASSO & GRASSO, ESQS. (JANE FININ and KATHLEEN R. 
DE CATALDO of counsel), for Charging Party 
MC PHILLIPS, FITZGERALD & MEYER, ESQS. (STERLING 
GOODSPEED and RICHARD V. MEATH of counsel), for 
Respondent 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the Glens 
Falls Firefighters Union, Local 2230, IAFF, AFL-CIO (Local 2230) 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) which 
dismissed two improper practice charges filed by Local 2230 
against the City of Glens Falls (City). Local 2230's first 
charge alleges that the City violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when, in mid-July 1989, it 
unilaterally adopted a work rule prohibiting political activity 
by unit employees. The second charge, as characterized by the 
ALJ, alleges that the City violated §209-a.1(d) when it 
implemented its July work rule in early January 1990. 
J 
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( ) 
Local 2230's first charge stems from a July 14, 1989 notice 
of discipline issued to Daniel Girard, a firefighter in Local 
2230's unit at all relevant times, which cites him for a 
violation of §6.16 of the City Charter (Charter) ,-3=/ which 
provides as follows: 
Political Activity Prohibited. No officer or 
member of either department-^ shall be a 
member of or a delegate to any political 
convention. He shall not solicit any person 
to vote at any political caucus, primary or 
election, nor challenge nor in any manner 
attempt to influence any voter thereat. He 
shall not be a member of any political 
committee, nor shall he make any contribution 
to any political fund. Any officer or member 
violating any provisions of this section 
shall be subject to such disciplinary action 
as the Board may deem proper. 
Local 223 0 alleges in its first charge that the City has 
never restricted the referenced political activities of unit 
employees. Local 2230 argues, therefore, that Girard's 
discipline pursuant to §6.16 of the Charter constituted a 
unilateral imposition of a new set of restrictions on outside 
political activity which had to be negotiated prior to 
promulgation. 
Local 2230's second charge stems from a notice of discipline 
issued to Girard on January 2, 1990. That notice charged Girard 
with a violation of §6.16 of the Charter on allegations that 
•^ /Girard' s campaign for a seat on the City Common Council 
apparently prompted this first notice of discipline which 
resulted in a 60-day suspension. 
•^/This reference is to the police and fire departments. 
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between July 1989 and November 1989, he solicited votes and 
attempted to influence voters at a political caucus, primary or 
election. The notice also charges Girard with a violation of 
General City Law §3, General Municipal Law §801 and of the common 
law rules of the State of New York because he was by that date an 
elected member of the City Common Council and simultaneously an 
employee of the City. Girard was suspended for 3 0 days pursuant 
to this second notice and was terminated from his firefighter 
position on January 30, 1990 by the Board of Public Safety after 
a hearing on that date.-3-/ 
Included among Local 2230*s fourteen numbered exceptions are 
allegations that the ALJ mischaracterized its second charge, 
erred in stating the dates of Girard's suspension and failed to 
consider or properly apply certain allegedly material parts of 
the record. Most of Local 2230's exceptions, however, relate to 
the ALJ's conclusion that the City had not acted unilaterally in 
issuing either notice of discipline because §6.16 of the City 
Charter (Charter) had been incorporated into the parties1 
1983-1988 contract. 
The City agrees with those parts of Local 223 0*s exceptions 
pertaining to the nature of the second charge and the dates of 
Girard's suspension, but it disagrees with all other parts of the 
exceptions. In addition to supporting the ALJ's basic conclusion 
•^The ALJ's statement of facts in this respect was not 
material to her decision, but we accept the parties' 
representation of the facts as set forth in the exceptions for 
background purposes. 
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i 
that it did not act unilaterally, the City argues that it did not 
change its practice regarding political activity, but merely 
applied existing requirements of local and state law and that its 
restrictions on political activity are not mandatorily 
negotiable. Alternatively, the City argues that the same 
external sources of state law render PERB powerless to order 
Girard's reinstatement for a violation of the restrictions on 
political activity. 
We begin our discussion by establishing a framework for 
analysis and by clarifying the second charge filed by Local 2230. 
The work rules in issue take the form of Girard's two 
notices of discipline. The cases are properly analyzed, as 
presented, as ones involving work rules because the City 
effectively informed all unit employees through Girard's notices 
of discipline that outside political activities of various types 
were prohibited and that the City would discipline employees for 
a violation of those prohibitions. 
The subject of the second charge is the City's prohibition 
against an employee holding elective office on the City Common 
Council. We disregard the ALJ's characterization of this charge 
to whatever extent it is or was intended to be different from 
that stated. 
The remaining exceptions are directed, in net effect, to the 
two-pronged inquiry whether the City's promulgation of these work 
rules was effected unilaterally and whether the rules embrace 
) 
mandatorily negotiable subject matter. 
Board - U-lllll & U-11364 
-5 
With respect to the first inquiry, the ALJ concluded that 
§6.16 of the Charter was incorporated into the parties1 1983-88 
labor contract by Article III of that contract which provides 
that the contract shall not "supersede any provisions of the 
Glens Falls City Charter". The language of the contract does 
not, as a matter of law, incorporate the Charter as one of its 
parts and there is no record evidence regarding the parties * 
intent in making this agreement. To the contrary, the contract 
language itself reflects only a mutual recognition of the 
separate existence of the Charter and a statement of its effect 
in the event of an inconsistency between the Charter and the 
contract. There is nothing to suggest, however, that Local 2230 
agreed to bind itself and its members to adherence to the 
Charter. Therefore, we grant those of Local 2230's exceptions 
directed to this aspect of the ALJ's decision and reverse the 
ALJ's decision in this regard. 
Continuing with the analysis of the first-stated inquiry, we 
find that the record establishes conclusively that the City has 
never in any way restricted the outside political activities of 
unit employees or disciplined them for engaging in same, despite 
knowledge and opportunity, notwithstanding §6.16 of the Charter 
or provisions of state statutory or common law. A cognizable 
change in practice is clearly established when an employer, in 
its executive capacity, first restricts the off-duty activities 
of its employees after years of a conscious and unbroken 
declination to enforce in any way restrictions earlier authorized 
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by legislative action.-^/ As the actionable change in practice 
is defined by reference to the employer's practice in fact, the 
City's claim that it made no change when it prohibited employees 
from holding positions on the Common Council because it was 
enforcing existing statutory and common law prohibitions on 
political activity by municipal employees is without merit. 
Those latter provisions of law are, however, directly relevant to 
the negotiability of the work rules, the second of the two 
necessary inquiries to which we now turn. 
The City's work rules restrict the employees' off-duty 
conduct and establish new grounds for the imposition of 
discipline, both subjects which we have held to be mandatorily 
negotiable.-5-/ The cases cited by the City for the proposition 
that restrictions on outside political activity do not embrace 
"terms and conditions of employment" are inapposite because they 
either do not involve such restrictions or do not raise any issue 
regarding their negotiability. There is, however, a recognized, 
albeit limited, public policy exception to the negotiations which 
would otherwise be required by the Act. That public policy 
exception is grounded upon those few statutory or common law 
provisions which clearly prohibit, in an absolute sense, parties 
•^The unilateral change analysis is necessarily tied to the 
date of the executive's first action because a legislative body's 
action is not reviewable under the refusal to negotiate 
provisions of the Act since it has neither right nor duty to 
bargain. 
^Citv of Newburah. 16 PERB }[3030 (1983); City of Buffalo, 
23 PERB 53050 (1990). 
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from entering into any agreement conflicting with the legal 
mandate.-6-/ It remains to be determined whether, as the City 
argues, the public policy exception to the duty to negotiate 
applies here. 
It is our finding that the statutory sources of prohibition 
cited by the City do not support such a public policy exception. 
General City Law §3 prohibits a member of a common council from 
holding other offices "under the appointment or election of the 
common council". There is no evidence that Girard holds his 
firefighter position by appointment or election of the Common 
Council and what evidence there is suggests plainly that it is 
the Board of Public Safety which has the power to appoint persons 
to firefighter positions. General Municipal Law §801 prohibits 
an employee from having an interest in a contract with a 
municipality if the employee has the power to negotiate or 
approve the contract or payments thereunder, to audit claims, or 
to appoint another with those duties. The only contract in which 
Girard is claimed to have an interest by virtue of his employment 
with the City is the collective bargaining agreement covering 
Local 2230's unit. Labor contracts, however, have been held by 
the New York State Court of Appeals not to be subject to General 
Municipal Law §8 01.-2/ 
^Port Jefferson Station Teachers Ass'n, Inc. v. Brookhaven-
Comsewogue Union Free School Dist., 45 N.Y.2d 898, 12 PERB 57502 
(1978); Board of Education of the City School Dist. of the City 
) of New York V. PERB, 75 N.Y.2d 660, 23 PERB 57012 (1990). 
^Stettine v. County of Suffolk. 66 N.Y.2d 354, 18 PERB 
57512 (1985). 
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Finally, the City alleges that its restriction on City 
employees holding elective office on the City Common Council is 
required by a common law prohibition against the holding of 
incompatible offices, a doctrine recognized by the Court of 
Appeals in People ex rel. Ryan v. Green.^/ The State Attorney 
General issued an informal opinion^/ at the City's request 
which concludes that the Common Council * s budgetary functions and 
its statutorily required approval-^/ of the City's labor 
contracts render City employment and City elective office 
incompatible based upon an actual or apparent conflict of 
interest which recusal could not effectively address. We concur 
with the opinion expressed by the Attorney General. A City 
J employee has employment interests which may be affected, 
beneficially or adversely, by actions necessarily taken by the 
City Common Council regarding any City department. We also 
consider there to be actual or apparent conflicts of interest so 
numerous and varied in a municipal employee serving on the Common 
Council that recusal is not a viable option. We do not, however, 
decide whether this incompatibility doctrine is appropriately 
applied to employees holding other elective offices. 
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the City's work 
rule restriction on an employee holding City employment and 
^ 5 8 N.Y. 295 (1874) . 
^ O p . Atty. Gen. 90-15 (March 15, 1990). 
i^/Act §§201.12 & 204-a.l. 
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Common Council office simultaneously is not mandatorily 
negotiable. As the City's unilateral promulgation of this rule 
was privileged, Local 223O's second charge (U-113 64) objecting 
only to the prohibition against employees holding Common Council 
office is dismissed and, therefore, Girard's suspension and 
subsequent termination pursuant to the January 2, 1990 notice of 
discipline will not be disturbed. The restrictions on other 
types of outside political activity referenced in §6.16 of the 
Charter^^/ are not required by other statutory provisions or 
common law. As these other work rule restrictions are 
mandatorily negotiable, the City's unilateral adoption of those 
restrictions violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act. The imposition of 
a 60-day suspension against Girard pursuant to the July 14, 1989 
notice of discipline must, therefore, be set aside. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge in U-11364 be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
Having found the City to have violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Act pursuant to Local 2230's first charge (U-11111), it is hereby 
ordered to: 
1. Cease and desist from disciplining any unit 
employee for engaging in those political 
activities specified in §6.16 of the Charter until 
it satisfies its duty to negotiate under the Act; 
J •1^ /The Charter does not cover an employee holding any elective office. 
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2. Rescind the July 14, 1989 Notice of 
Discipline issued to Daniel Girard and 
expunge any record of that Notice of 
Discipline from any personnel files kept by 
or on behalf of the City; 
3. Make Daniel Girard whole for any wages or 
benefits lost as a result of the July 14, 
1989 Notice of Discipline, with interest at 
the currently prevailing maximum legal rate; 
and 
4. Sign and post notice in the form attached at 
all locations ordinarily used to post 
informational notices to unit employees. 
DATED: July 10, 1991 
Albany, New York 
% J t ^ ^]/Lxt\tJ\f. 
Pauline R. Kmsel la , Chairperson 
r. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Mem/er 
) 
APPENDIX 
MQTICE TO ALL EM 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify 
all employees m the unit represented by the Glens 
Falls Firefighters Union, Local 223 0, IAFF, AFL-CIO that the City 
of Glens Falls: 
1. Will not discipline any unit employee for 
engaging in those political activities 
specified in §6.16 of the City Charter until 
it satisfies its duty to negotiate under the 
Act; 
2. Will rescind the July 14, 1989 Notice of 
Discipline issued to Daniel Girard and will 
expunge any record of that Notice of 
Discipline from any personnel files kept by or 
on behalf of the City; 
3. Will make Daniel Girard whole for any wages or 
benefits lost as a result of the July 14, 1989 
Notice of Discipline, with interest at the 
currently prevailing' maximum legal rate. 
CITY- -OF GLENS- -FALLS-
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2E-7/10/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
( ) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 1056, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
---and-^ Cas e—N-O-.—U-^ -l-O-8-l-Q 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
HANS & CERNIGLIA, P.C. (STEPHEN HANS of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
ALBERT C. COSENZA, ESQ. (JOYCE R. ELLMAN of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Amalgamated 
Transit Union, Local 1056, AFL-CIO (ATU) to the dismissal of its 
improper practice charge against the New York City Transit 
Authority (Authority). The charge alleges that the Authority 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it announced on December 14, 1988 that employees would 
no longer be provided with free parking at the Authority's 
Flushing depot following, and as the result of, construction at 
that facility. 
The assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the 
charge, after hearing, upon the ground that the ATU failed to 
establish that the change in the availability of free parking to 
employees constitutes a change in terms and conditions of 
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employment, because, since 1976, the provision of parking by the 
Authority has been subject to the following condition: 
The granting of permission to eligible 
employees to park their private vehicles on 
Authority property is at the absolute 
discretion of the Authority and is subject to 
being withdrawn at any time. 
While, prior to 1976, no such condition applied to the grant 
of free parking space, the ALT found that the condition has been 
consistently applied to all bargaining unit members who made 
application for and received parking permits since 1976, and that 
the ATU had knowledge of the Authority's inclusion of the 
condition in the parking application packet provided to 
employees. 
Having found that the grant of parking has been a 
conditional one since 1976, the ALT concluded that the 
Authority's elimination of free parking facilities as a result of 
its construction program, constitutes nothing more than an 
exercise of the discretion to do so, which it had reserved to 
itself since 1976. The elimination of parking facilities 
accordingly was found by the ALT to constitute a continuation, 
rather than a change, in the practice in effect since 1976. 
Notwithstanding the exceptions of the ATU, we affirm the 
ALT's factual holdings that while the grant of parking access was 
unlimited prior to 1976, it became limited and conditional 
thereafter, that the condition is clear, explicit, and 
unambiguous, and that the ATU had notice of its existence. 
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We therefore conclude that, to the extent the grant of 
parking benefits was conditional, the ALJ properly dismissed the 
charge. -1/ 
In its response to the exceptions, the Authority argues, 
inter alia, that its elimination of free parking at the Flushing 
depot is a management prerogative because the Authority's 
interest in constructing new depot buildings outweighs the 
employees1 interest in free parking access, such that free 
parking does not constitute a term or condition of employment in 
these circumstances. We disagree. The need to construct 
additional facilities does not extinguish the right to negotiate 
the benefit of free parking access to the employer's workplace, 
nor does the duty to negotiate concerning parking facilities 
control or interfere with the management prerogative to construct 
new facilities. The essence of the parking benefit does not lie 
in the specific geographic area designated for that purpose, but 
in the availability of a place for employees to park, without 
cost, at or within reasonable proximity to the workplace. In our 
view, the unconditional grant of such parking benefits 
establishes a term and condition of employment which cannot be 
eliminated without negotiation.^/ In the instant case, the 
unconditional grant of parking benefits appears to have existed 
only prior to 1976 and not thereafter. Thus, the ALJ properly 
•^/Accord Gananda CSD, 17 PERB K3095 (1984) . 
^State of New York, 6 PERB 53005 (1973). 
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dismissed the charge insofar as it applied to persons who 
obtained parking permits subject to the condition identified by 
the Authority since 1976. However, as to those persons who may 
have acquired parking permits prior to 1976, when no such 
condition applied, a unilateral change in terms and conditions of 
employment as to those employees is here shown. This is so 
because the condition imposed by the Authority is specifically 
and exclusively directed to applicants for permits and not to all 
persons who park, regardless of when that benefit was conferred. 
The Board, therefore, grants the exceptions of the ATU to the 
extent of the ALJ finding a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act 
in the unilateral elimination of free parking access to the 
Authority's Flushing depot for any bargaining unit members who 
applied for and received parking permits prior to 1976, when the 
grant of parking permits became conditional. Those bargaining 
unit members, if any, who have incurred parking expenses since 
elimination of free parking on or about December 14, 1988, must 
be made whole for such economic loss by the Authority, and the 
Authority shall negotiate in good faith with the ATU concerning 
the provision of free parking benefits to bargaining unit members 
who received parking permits prior to 1976. 
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IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED THAT: 
The charge is dismissed as to those bargaining unit 
members who have received parking permits since 1976; 
The Authority shall promptly identify, in writing, and 
submit to the ATU the names of any and all bargaining 
unit members who received parking permits prior to 1976 
and who remained in employment at the Flushing depot 
after December 14, 1988; 
The Authority shall provide free parking benefits on 
or within reasonable proximity to the Authority's 
Flushing depot premises to any and all bargaining unit 
members who received parking permits prior to 1976 and 
who remained in employment at the Flushing depot after 
December 14, 1988; 
The Authority shall make whole any such bargaining unit 
members who, upon a showing of reasonable documentary 
evidence, and/or affidavits, that they incurred parking 
expenses which they would not otherwise have incurred 
since December 14, 1988, but for the elimination of 
free parking on the Authority's Flushing depot premises 
until the free parking benefits provided by paragraph 3 
are restored; and 
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The Authority shall post the attached notice at all 
work locations customarily used to communicate 
information to ATU bargaining unit members. 
July-1-0,--19-91 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees of the New York City Transit Authorty in the unit 
represented by the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1056, AFL-CIO that: 
1. The Authority shall promptly identify, in writing, and submit 
to the ATU the names of any and all bargaining unit members who 
received parking permits prior to 1976 and who remained in 
employment at the Flushing depot after December 14, 1988; 
2. The Authority shall provide free parkin? benefits on or within 
reasonable proximity to the Authority's Flushing depot premises 
to any and all bargaining unit members who received parking 
permits prior to 1976 and who remained in employment at the 
Flushing depot after December 14, 1988; and-
3. The Authority shall make whole any such bargaining unit members 
who, upon a showing of reasonable documentary evidence, and/or affi-
davits, that they incurred parking expenses which they would not 
otherwise have incurred since.December 14, 1988, but for the 
elimination of free parking on the Authority's Flushing depot 
premises until the free parking benefits provided by paragraph 
2 are restored. 
New York City Transit Authority 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2F-7/10/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
^ PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DEPUTY SHERIFF'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION 
OF ONONDAGA COUNTY, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-10891 
and
 : 
COUNTY OF ONONDAGA, 
Respondent, 
-and-
ONONDAGA LOCAL 834, CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
COSTELLO, COONEY & FEARON (MICHAEL A. TREMONT of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
JON A. GERBER, ESQ. (LAWRENCE R. WILLIAMS of counsel), 
for Respondent 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (STEVEN A. CRAIN of counsel), 
for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the County of 
Onondaga (County) and the Deputy Sheriff's Benevolent Association 
of Onondaga County (DSBA) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) which found that the County had violated §209-a.l(d) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
unilaterally transferring DSBA bargaining unit work to employees 
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of another unit.^/ In particular, the ALJ found that the 
County improperly ceased using deputy sheriff-jailers represented 
by DSBA to guard certain pre-trial and pre-sentence inmates and 
caused this work to be performed by correction officers in a 
bargaining unit represented by Onondaga Local 834, Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) .•2/ 
The County excepts to certain findings of fact and a failure 
to find that DSBA waived its right to negotiate. It also argues 
that the ALJ's order interferes with County rights and 
responsibilities under the Correction Law and local law. 
For the reasons which follow, the County's exceptions are 
dismissed and the ALJ's decision is affirmed except as to remedy, 
which we modify in accordance with an exception filed by the 
DSBA. 
FACTS 
The County houses its prisoners in two facilities. One is 
the Public Safety Building (jail), which is staffed by deputy 
sheriff-jailers; the other is the Onondaga County Correctional 
Facility at Jamesville (correctional facility), which is staffed 
by correction officers. 
±JCharges alleging County violations of §§209-a.l(a), (b) 
and (c) of the Act were also disposed of by the ALJ. However, no 
exceptions were taken to the ALJ's dismissal of those charges, 
and they are not before us. 
•2/cSEA did not file any exceptions to the ALJ's decision. 
) 
Board - U-10891 -3 
Individuals incarcerated at the jail are primarily pre-trial 
and pre-sentence inmates who may be charged with an offense 
ranging anywhere from a misdemeanor to a class A felony. On the 
other hand, inmates of the correctional facility are, for the 
most part, individuals whose sentences are limited to less than 
one year. The job duties of both correction officers and deputy 
sheriff-jailers in guarding inmates are substantially similar. 
Historically, only deputy sheriff-jailers have been 
responsible for guarding pre-trial and pre-sentence prisoners, 
regardless of the location of such prisoners. For example, the 
deputy sheriff-jailers guarded pre-trial and pre-sentence inmates 
who were confined to the Hutching Psychiatric Center until it was 
closed. And, in the early 1970s, as a result of overcrowding at 
the jail, they guarded approximately 80 pre-trial and pre-
sentence prisoners who were transferred to the correctional 
facility where they were housed in a separate wing for 
approximately a year. They have also been responsible for 
transporting such inmates to and from court and medical or 
psychiatric facilities. 
In April 1989, as a result of a federal court order to 
alleviate jail overcrowding, about 25 pre-trial and pre-sentence 
prisoners were transferred to a newly-constructed modular unit at 
the correctional facility referred to as the Annex. The Annex is 
separate from the rest of the correctional facility. There is no 
interchange between the prisoners who were transferred to the 
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Annex and those prisoners who were sentenced to the correctional 
facility. Except for one deputy sheriff-jailer who was assigned 
to the Annex very briefly to act as a liaison between it and the 
jail, no other members of the DSBA bargaining unit were assigned 
to the transferred prisoners at the Annex. Instead, the County 
assigned correction officers to guard them. The improper 
practice charge which is the subject of this decision then 
ensued. 
DISCUSSION 
A transfer of unit work is mandatorily negotiable if the 
work has been performed by unit employees exclusively and the 
tasks as reassigned are substantially similar to those previously 
performed by unit employees.-3-' As the County does not dispute 
that the correction officers' guarding of pre-trial and pre-
sentence prisoners housed at the Annex is substantially similar 
to the work performed by the deputy sheriff-jailers when they 
guarded those prisoners, one prong of PERB's test is met. As 
there has been no significant change in qualifications, a 
violation depends upon proof of exclusivity which, in this case, 
rests entirely on the definition of the DSBA's bargaining unit 
work. 
We have previously held that there can be a discernible 
boundary to unit work which can preserve a defined portion of 
^Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, 18 PERB [^3 083, 
at 3182 (1985). 
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work exclusively to a particular bargaining unit.-4-/ Although 
the work of deputy sheriff-jailers may be described, in general, 
as guarding prisoners, their primary function has been to guard 
pre-trial and pre-sentence inmates. For the reasons which 
follow, we find, in agreement with the ALJ, that a discernible 
boundary has been established as to this function, which has been 
the exclusive responsibility of deputy sheriff-jailers. 
The County itself has long recognized a boundary between 
pre-trial and pre-sentence prisoners and sentenced prisoners as 
evidenced by the County's housing them in separate facilities and 
its prior assignments of deputy sheriff-jailers and correction 
officers by the identity of inmate. 
The record also evidences that deputy sheriff-jailers face a 
particularly difficult inmate population, undergo a lengthier 
training and have a higher pay scale than correction officers. 
This provides further support for our conclusion that their work 
is distinguishable from the general category of work involving 
the guarding of prisoners. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The County excepts to the ALJ's finding that pre-trial and 
pre-sentence inmates are more difficult to handle than the 
sentenced inmates at the correctional facility. Such finding, 
4/citv of Rochester, 21 PERB ?[3040 (1988), conf'd, 
155 A.D.2d 1003, 22 PERB ^[7035 (4th Dep't 1989); Town of West 
Seneca, 19 PERB f3028 (1986). 
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however, is fully supported by the record. Indian River Central 
School District5-/, which the County cites in support of its 
exception, is inapposite because of our finding that DSBA's unit 
work is exclusive to it. The County's remaining exceptions as to 
factual findings are rejected because the findings excepted to 
were not made by the ALT and, even if they had been, they would 
not alter the disposition of this matter. 
The County also argues that the ALT's decision interferes 
with the exclusive responsibility of the State Commission of 
Corrections in matters relating to the custody of inmates in 
local correctional facilities and, in particular, the 
Commission's authority under Correction Law §504 to designate the 
Jamesville Correctional Facility as a substitute jail for pre-
trial and pre-sentence inmates. The issue of custody, in the 
sense used by the County in its exceptions, was not litigated in 
this case and the substitute jail orders, upon which the County 
relies, do not even refer to custody. In any case, there is no 
evidence that the assignment of deputy sheriff-jailers to guard 
the pre-trial and pre-sentence prisoners at the Annex would 
interfere with custody matters. Further, the ALT's decision does 
not impede the County's right to transfer inmates from the jail 
to the Annex. Rather, her consideration is limited to deciding 
who shall guard the transferred inmates. This presents a 
; 
5
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/ 
/ collective bargaining issue which PERB has jurisdiction to decide 
/ under §205.5(d) of the Act. 
The County next argues that the ALJ's decision precludes it 
from mixing sentenced and unsentenced inmates which Correction 
Law §500-b does allow. The facts of this case do not present an 
issue as to the County's right to mix sentenced and unsentenced 
prisoners. 
There is no evidence to support the County's claim that the 
ALJ's decision will interfere with the requirement of the 
Onondaga County Charter and the Administrative Code that the 
Sheriff and County Commissioner of Corrections care for all 
inmates housed in their respective facilities. In any event, if 
a conflict exists between the Charter and Code, both local laws, 
and the Civil Service Law, the local law cannot supersede the 
Civil Service Law or limit its intended effect. 
Finally, the County's argument that the DSBA waived its 
right to bargain about the transfer of unit work by agreeing to 
include in its contract with the County a provision giving the 
County the right "to maintain the efficiency of government 
operations" must be rejected. A claim of waiver must be pleaded 
in an answer and proved.-^/ The County has failed to interpose 
^New York City Transit Authority v. PERB, 2 0 PERB 53037 
(1987), confjjd, 147 A.D.2d 574, 22 PERB 57001 (2d Dep't 1989), 
enforced. 156 A.D.2d 689, 23 PERB J[7002 (2d Dep't 1989). 
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waiver as an affirmative defense in its answer and there is no 
evidence that such a waiver occurred. 
In its exceptions, the DSBA argues that the ALJ's order is 
insufficient as it does not provide for a make whole remedy and 
thereby allows the County to retain the fruits of its violation. 
We agree and, therefore, grant this exception. However, we 
dismiss the DSBA's exception to the ALJ's refusal to allow 
evidence on damages. In the event the parties are unable to 
agree on what, if any, lost wages, overtime or benefits were 
suffered as a result of the transfer of unit work, either party 
may make an application to the Board to reopen this case on the 
issue of damages as necessary.-^/ 
Based on the foregoing, we find that the County violated 
§2 09-a.l(d) of the Act when it unilaterally transferred DSBA's 
bargaining unit work of guarding pre-trial and pre-sentence 
inmates to correction officers in the CSEA bargaining unit. 
Accordingly, we modify the ALJ's order by granting back pay, 
overtime and lost benefits, if any, and sustain her decision and 
order in all other respects. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Rescind its order assigning correction officers 
represented by CSEA to guard pre-sentence and pre-trial 
; 
^ C o u n t y of Broome. 22 PERB J[3019 (1989) ; C i t y of Roches te r , 
supra no te 4 . 
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prisoners housed at the Jamesville Correctional 
Facility Annex; 
Assign to DSBA unit members the responsibility for 
securing pre-sentence and pre-trial prisoners housed at 
the Jamesville Correctional Facility Annex; 
4. 
Pay DSBA unit members lost wages, overtime and 
benefits, if any, suffered as a result of the transfer 
of their unit work, plus interest at the maximum legal 
rate; and 
Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
customarily used to communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: July 10, 1991 
Albany, New York 
f^-UJy^. |^ j^^y^y^ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
IMM*Z- x. 1L 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Me: 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
w e hereby notify
 t n Q e m p i o y e e s o f the County of Onondaga in the units 
represented by the Deputy Sheriff's Benevolent Association of 
Onondaga County (DSBA) and the Onondaga Local 834, Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) that the County: 
1. Will rescind its order assigning correction 
officers represented by CSEA to guard pre-
sentence and pre-trial prisoners housed at the 
Jamesville Correctional Facility Annex; 
2. Will assign to DSBA unit members the 
responsibility for securing pre-sentence and 
pre-trial prisoners housed at the Jamesville 
Correctional Facility Annex; and 
3. Will pay DSBA unit members lost wages, 
overtime and benefits, if any, suffered as a 
result of the transfer of their unit work, 
plus interest at the maximum legal rate. 
. COUNTY.OF.ONONDAGA. 
Dated oy • • • • 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be alien 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2G-7/10/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of the 
YONKERS FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 8 60, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
CASE NO. D-0246 
Respondent, 
-upon—the—Cha-rg-e—o-f—Vio-1-a-td-on—of 
§210.1 of the Civil Service Law 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On August 29, 1990, John M. Crotty, this agency's Counsel, 
filed a charge alleging that the Yonkers Federation of Teachers, 
Local 860, AFT, AFL-CIO, had violated Civil Service Law (CSL) 
§210.1 in that it caused, instigated, encouraged or condoned a 
strike against the Yonkers City School District on June 1 and 
June 4, 1990. 
The charge further alleged that of the 1,698 employees in 
the negotiating unit, 1,688 employees participated in the strike. 
The Respondent requested Counsel to indicate the penalty he 
would be willing to recommend to this Board as appropriate for 
the violation charged. Counsel proposed a penalty of the loss of 
Respondent's right to have dues and agency shop fee deduction 
privileges to the extent of twenty-five percent (25%) of the 
amount which would otherwise be deducted during a year.^/ 
•^This is intended to be the equivalent of a three-month 
^ ; suspension of privileges of dues and agency shop fee deductions, 
if any, if such were withheld in twelve monthly installments. 
Case No. D-0246 -2 
Upon the understanding that Counsel would recommend and this 
Board would accept that penalty, the Respondent withdrew its 
answer to the charge. Counsel has so recommended. We determine 
that the recommended penalty is a reasonable one and will 
effectuate the policies of the Act. 
WE ORDER that the dues and agency shop fee deduction rights 
of the Yonkers Federation of Teachers, Local 860, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
be suspended, commencing on the first practicable date, and 
continuing for such period of time during which twenty-five 
percent (25%) of its annual agency shop fees, if any, and dues 
would otherwise be deducted. Thereafter, no dues or agency shop 
fees shall be deducted on its behalf by the Yonkers City School 
District until the Respondent affirms that it no longer asserts 
the right to strike against any government as required by the 
provisions of CSL §210.3(g). 
DATED: July 10, 1991 
Albany, New York 
%x^y^K Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Mem/er 
#2H-7/10/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
LOCAL 200-C, 
Petitioner, 
and CASE—NQT—C-37 56 
CANANDAIGUA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
THOMAS M. BEATTY, for Petitioner 
JAMES SPITZ, JR., ESQ., for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On October 18, 1990, the Service Employees International 
Union, Local 2 00-C (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the 
Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a 
timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive 
representative of certain employees of the Canandaigua City 
School District (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in 
which they stipulated that the following negotiating unit was 
appropriate: 
Included: All regular and regular part-time bus drivers. 
Excluded: All substitute bus drivers, all bus mechanics, 
all bus aides, and all other employees of the 
District. 
Case No. C-3756 - 2 -
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was 
held on June 14, 1991.-3=/ 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a 
majority of the eligible voters in the unit who cast ballots do 
not desire to be represented for the purpose of collective 
bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition 
should be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 10, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberq, Member 8 
•i/ Of the 4 6 employees in the unit, 4 6 ballots were cast 
were for representation and 28 against representation. 
There were three challenged ballots. 
— 15 
#3A-7/10/91 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF 
AMERICA, LOCAL 649, 
Petitioner-^ 
-and- CASE NO. C-3813 
TOWN OF BOLIVAR, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 
649 has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
) 
Certification - C-3813 - 2 
Unit: Included: All Motor Equipment Operators, Laborers and 
Mechanics. 
Excluded: Supervisors, Clerical, Guards and others 
defined by the Act, 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shai-l^negotriate—eo-1-l-ect^ 
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 
Local 649. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 10, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member * 
#3B-7/10/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, 
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
Petitioner-^ 
-and- CASE NO. C-3835 
TOWN OF CARLISLE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 294, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
) 
Certification - C-3835 - 2 -
Unit: Included: All full and part-time highway employees. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 294, 
International—Brotherhood—of—Teamsters-, —Ghauf-feurs-^—Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: July 10, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, "Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member f 
#3C-7/10/91 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
^ PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 317, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, 
WAREHOUSEMAN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
and CASE-NOv^C-3801 
TOWN OF PALERMO, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 317, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: M.E.O. 
Excluded: All others, including clerical, office, 
professional guards and supervisors. -
Certification - C-3801 
- 2 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 317, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
eol-leet-ively--i-neiudes--the~mutuai-"OblHLgation—to-~meet~at--reasonab-l-e 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: July 10, 1991 
Albany, New York 
|uA-^b^il 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
huc^f. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
Eric if. Schmertz, Member 
#3D-7/10/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
"*) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION OF 
NEW YORK STATE/QUEENSBURY ADMINISTRATORS 
& SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3798 
QUEENSBURY UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees* Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the School Administrators 
Association of New York State/Queensbury Administrators & 
Supervisors Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-3798 2 -
Unit: Included: Principals, Assistant Principals, and Director 
of Health, Physical Education and Athletics, 
Excluded: Superintendent, Business Manager, Director of 
Pupil Personnel Services, and all other 
employees of the School District. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the School Administrators 
Association of New York State/Queensbury Administrators & 
Supervisors Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: July 10, 1991 
Albany, New York 
SJv-
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
/AL44£^ if.^i^^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member  / 
#3E-7/10/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
and Gas-B-MQ-i—e-37-52-
VILLAGE OF WAPPINGERS FALLS, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
\ accordance with the Public Employees* Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All police officers (full-time, part-time and 
hourly), 
Excluded: Chief of Police. 
J -
Certification - C-3752 
- 2 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 10, 1991 
Albany, New York 
J4 wi y ^ K. jC \rwt >j U^ 
Pauline R. Kmsel la , Chairperson 
falter L. Eisenberq, Member w g  
Eric jy^Schmertz, Member 
#3F-7/10/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNCIL OF SUPERVISORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3662 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
) . 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Council of Supervisors and 
Administrators of the City of New York has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
J 
Certification - C-3662 
- 2 -
Unit: Included: Chairpersons of the Subcommittee on Special 
Education. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Council of Supervisors and 
Administrators of the City of New York. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: July 10, 1991 
Albany, New York 
£.,(•:. ft M , . 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member { 
Eric Jr. Schmertz, Member 
#3G-7/10/91 
• STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
i\:n 
!/ In the Matter of 
! 
LOCAL 20OB, SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL 
UNION, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3788 
AUBURN ENLARGED CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 20OB, Service Employees 
International Union, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, 
in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Attendance Officer Aide, District Treasurer, 
Registered Professional Nurse, Senior Nurse 
(School District), Tax Collector, Senior 
Building Maintenance Mechanic (Supervisor), 
Head Bus Driver, Motor Vehicle Operator (Head), 
Watchperson. 
Excluded: All others in the Auburn Enlarged School 
District. 
Certification - C-3788 2 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 200B, Service Employees 
International Union, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: July 10, 1991 
Albany, New York 
^ J- -i .! T-* * -r>J in 4^ -Pauline R.' Kins el la", Chairperson 
Eric Cfcf Schmertz, Member U 
#3H-7/10/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-379 6 
WATERTOWN HOUSING AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 




All Maintenance Men, Inventory 
Clerk/Maintenance Men, Clerks and Modernization 
Aides; 
Executive Director, Maintenance Supervisor, 
Tenant Relations Assistant, Modernization 
Coordinator, Principal Account Clerk and 
Account Clerk. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 10, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, "Chai rperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member I 
Schmertz, Member^ 
#31-7/10/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED INDUSTRY WORKERS, LOCAL 424, 
Petitioner, 
and GASE-NO^—G-3-78-7 
EAST ISLIP UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 144, DIVISION 100, SEIU, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Industry Workers, 
Local 424 has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
) 
settlement of grievances. 
Cer t i f i ca t ion - C-3787 - 2 -
Unit: Included: 
Excluded: 
All permanent full-time, part-time Chief 
Custodians, Head Custodians, Custodial, 
Maintenance and Ground employees. 
Superintendent of Buildings and Grounds, 
Maintenance Foreman, Night Foreman, substitutes 
and casual and seasonal personnel, and all 
other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Industry Workers, 
Local 424. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 10, 1991 
Albany, New York 
< W W N.,KA«V.<J(MU 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member* 
Eric Cfcf Schmertz, Member 
#5A-7/10/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
SO WOLF ROAD 
ALBANY, NEW YORK 12205-2670 
RESOLUTION 
BE IT RESOLVED, that at a meeting of the New York State 
Public Employment Relations Board, held in Albany, New York on 
July 10, 1991, that the Board hereby delegates to its Chairperson 
the following powers, duties and functions: 
1. to enter into agreements for the provision of goods and 
services; 
2. to hire, lay off, discharge and deploy staff; 
3. to assign staff or members of the mediation, 
fact finding and arbitration panels to 
specific disputes; 
4. to issue subpoenas in connection with pending 
cases; 
5. to otherwise conduct the day-to-day operation 
of the agency in all respects. 
The following shall remain the responsibility of the Board: 
1. to promulgate rules of procedure; 
2. to issue Board decisions and orders and to 
authorize appeals from judicial orders or the 
initiation of enforcement proceedings; 
) 
^J printed on recycled paper 
3. to appoint persons to per diem panels of 
mediators, fact finders, and arbitrators; 
4. to authorize the operation of local govern-
ment public employment relations boards and 
to approve procedures for the determination 
of representation status of local employees; 
_5-.—to—certify—entitlement—to—interest 
arbitration to the extent required by §209 of 
the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act; 
to determine the penalty to be imposed upon 
employee organizations found responsible for 
strike activity, in violation of §210 of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
to certify employee organizations as 
representatives of units of employees 
following elections or other proof of 
majority status. 
to perform such other functions as are required of the 
Board by law. 
SO RESOLVED. 
DATED: July 10, 1991 
feyjit ^ jh\t Kfv^sql 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter- L. Eisenberg, Memb 
E^ac J. Schmertz, Me: 
